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STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
I. TAX LIABILITY OF MULTISTATE CORPORATIONS SELLING LAND
IN SOUTH CAROLINA
In Hercules, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Commission,1 the
South Carolina Supreme Court considered the state tax liability
incurred by a multistate corporation in the sale of real property
located in South Carolina. The court held that taxable gain re-
sulting from recapture of depreciation is to be apportioned
2
among the states in which the business is taxed. In dicta, how-
ever, the court indicated that any true gain resulting from a sale
of real property located in South Carolina would be allocated 3
entirely to South Carolina. The result of this case appears to
contradict the holding of Boyle Utilities v. South Carolina Tax
Commission,4 in which the supreme court interpreted the per-
sonal property section5 of the same South Carolina statute and
concluded that all gains associated with such sales, including the
recapture of depreciation, are allocable to South Carolina. The
holding of Hercules will completely alter the Tax Commission's
method of taxing gainse from sales of real property under section
12-7-1120(4)7 of the South Carolina Code.
1. 279 S.C. 177, 304 S.E.2d 815 (1983).
2. To apportion income means to distribute it, on a percentage basis, among the
states in which the multistate taxpayer does business.
3. Under South Carolina tax law, to allocate income means to assign it, for tax pur-
poses, to a particular state.
4. 273 S.C. 93, 254 S.E.2d 308 (1979).
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-1120(6)(1976)(deleted by amendment in 1977) provided in
part:
Gains and losses from the sale of tangible personal property, other than
tangible personal property held for sale to customers in the regular course of
business, are allocable to this State, if:
(a) The property had a situs in this State at the time of the sale....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-1120(6)(1976)(deleted by amendment in 1977).
6. Before this decision, all taxable gains, whether resulting from actual appreciation
or from recapture of depreciation, were considered allocable to the situs state. Record at
99.
7. The Code provides in pertinent part-
The following items of income shall be specifically and directly allocated
in accordance with the following provisions before apportionment of the re-
1
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Hercules, Inc. is a multistate corporation domiciled outside
of South Carolina. The corporation owned a plant facility in
South Carolina, which it depreciated for income tax purposes
from 1966 to 1970, apportioning the depreciation among the
forty states in which it does business. Approximately 1.5% was
apportioned to South Carolina.' In 1970 Hercules, Inc. sold the
facility at an actual loss, but with a taxable gain due to recap-
ture of depreciationY
The sales contract provided for installment payments in
1972, 1973, and 1974. Hercules, Inc. elected, without specifically
notifying the Tax Commission, to report the sale on the install-
ment plan. The 1972 return was thus the first to reflect the sale.
Approximately 1.5% of the taxable gain from the first payment
was apportioned to South Carolina, in keeping with the appor-
tionment of depreciation.10
Relying on South Carolina Code section 12-7-1120(4), which
provides that gain or loss from sales of real property should be
allocated to the situs state, the Tax Commission maintained
that the gain should not have been apportioned-that the entire
gain from the sale was taxable in South Carolina-and it or-
dered Hercules, Inc. to pay taxes on the entire gain realized
from the sale.11 Hercules, Inc. complied in 1976, paying the taxes
maining net income, and such items shall not be included in any factor of the
apportionment formula:
(4) Gains and losses from the sale of real property located in this State
are allocable to this State, and the gains and losses from the sale of real
property located outside this State shall be allocated to the state in
which the real property is located.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-1120(4)(Supp. 1982). Subsection (4) was formerly S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 12-7-1120(5) (1976).
8. 279 S.C. at 179, 304 S.E.2d at 817.
9. In 1966, Hercules bought the facility for $15,039,331. From 1966 to 1970, the cor-
poration deducted a total of $7,493,964 for depreciation. Of this amount, $111,115 was
deducted from income reported in South Carolina; the remaining 98.5% of the deprecia-
tion claimed was apportioned to other states. In 1970, the plant sold for $13,750,000. The
adjusted tax basis for federal income tax purposes at this time was approximately
$7,550,000 (original purchase price minus depreciation deductions allowed). Therefore,
the sale resulted in a taxable gain of approximately $6,200,000 (sales price minus ad-
justed basis). Record at 33-34. A true gain would result only if the sales price were higher
than the original purchase price of $15,039,331.
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under protest.12
Hercules, Inc. brought suit to recover these taxes, and the
trial court determined that the taxable gain indeed should have
been apportioned. In an opinion issued on May 3, 1983, the
South Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that
the taxable gain should be apportioned, not allocated,,3 but held
that the trial court's decision was erroneous concerning the
amount due.1 4 On June 27, the supreme court denied a petition
for rehearing, but withdrew the previous decision and substi-
tuted its final opinion.
In that opinion, the supreme court held that Hercules, Inc.
was correct in apportioning the taxable gain among the forty
states because the depreciation had been apportioned.15 If the
entire amount of the gain were allocated to South Carolina, this
state would recapture all the depreciation taken, either denying
other states the right to recapture or subjecting Hercules, Inc. to
double taxation.16 The court reasoned that apportionment of de-
preciation had resulted in higher tax revenues for South Caro-
lina from 1966 to 1970,17 so that it would now be inequitable to
allocate to South Carolina all of the gain based on recapture.18
12. The Tax Commission also contended that the entire sale should have been re-
ported in 1970, and that the taxpayer could not use the installment reporting method
because there was no formal "election" to do so. Record at 7. The supreme court held
that Hercules, Inc. properly treated the transaction as an installment sale, and that the
trial court had correctly relied upon Hay v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 273 S.C. 269,
255 S.E.2d 837 (1979), which held that an election could be made simply by "inserting in
the return the amount reportable as taxable income." Id. at 273, 255 S.E.2d at 840.
13. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-1120, which provides for allocation of gain to the state,
was first enacted in 1926. The courts agreed that the newer statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-
7-250, which provides for apportionment, was controlling.
14. Hercules, Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Conm'n, No. 21914, slip op. at 12-13 (S.C.
May 3, 1983), reh'g. denied, withdrawn, 279 S.C. 178, 304 S.E.2d 815 (1983). The trial
court had relied on a formula suggested by a representative of the Tax Commission,
emphasizing "equitable" considerations and based on computations of depreciation
taken on Hercules, Inc.'s worldwide assets. Record at 16-18. The supreme court stated
that the specific terms of S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-250, rather than equitable principles,
should control. 279 S.C. at 181, 304 S.E.2d at 817-18.
15. 279 S.C. at 181, 304 S.E.2d at 818.
16. Id.
17. The method of reporting resulted in greater income tax to South Carolina be-
cause only 1.5% of total depreciation from the South Carolina plant was used to de-
crease reported South Carolina income.
18. 279 S.C. at 181, 304 S.E.2d at 818. The court also decided how much interest
was due Hercules, Inc. and stated that S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-2310 specifically controls
the payment of interest in this case, so that the 1979 amendment of S.C. CODE ANN. §
3
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The result in Hercules, apportioning rather than allocating
the gain, appears inconsistent with that in Boyle Utilities v.
South Carolina Tax Commission.9 The cases are factually dis-
tinguishable because Hercules concerns real property and Boyle
deals with personal property. However, both cases fall under
subdivisions of section 12-7-1120,2o which allocates to South
Carolina gains and losses derived from sale of property in the
state. The taxpayer 21 in Boyle, in liquidating its business,
brought all its equipment to its home office in South Carolina to
be sold. The corporation realized a taxable gain on this sale due
to recapture of depreciation. 22 In computing its taxes, the corpo-
ration subtracted the amount of this gain from its overall loss
for the year and then apportioned the remaining loss between
Georgia and South Carolina. The Tax Commission contended
that the entire gain should have been allocated to South Caro-
lina before the loss was apportioned between the states. The
taxpayer argued that the treatment of income should match the
treatment of deductions.23 The main thrust of the taxpayer's ar-
gument, however, was that section 12-7-1120(4) should be inter-
preted to apply only to non-business income.24 The supreme
court rejected this contention and held that the entire gain
should have been allocated to South Carolina.
While Hercules seems inconsistent with Boyle, there are at
least two reasons for its different result. First, the taxpayer in
Hercules emphasized that the gain was due only to recapture of
depreciation, and stressed that states which had allowed depre-
ciation deductions on the plant should be allowed to tax their
shares of the gain resulting from recapture of depreciation. The
34-31-20, regarding the rate of interest on judgments, was irrelevant. Id. at 182, 304
S.E.2d at 818.
19. 273 S.C. 93, 254 S.E.2d 308 (1979).
20. Compare text of S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-1120(6), set out supra note 5, with text
of S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-1120(4), set out supra note 7.
21. Boyle Utilities, Inc. installed sanitation pipelines in South Carolina and Georgia
in the year in question. It was incorporated in and had its principal place of business in
South Carolina. 273 S.C. at 94, 254 S.E.2d at 309.
22. Brief of Appellant at 18-19, Boyle.
23. As in Hercules, depreciation deductions had been apportioned among the states
where the company did business. Brief of Appellant at 19-21, Boyle.
24. Brief of Appellant at 4-18. Appellants brief gives a detailed analysis of the
background and legislative history of the statute, as well as some comparison with simi-
lar statutes in other jurisdictions.
[Vol. 36
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court apparently responded to this appeal to "fairness." Second,
the taxpayer argued the unconstitutionality of double taxation.2 5
Hercules, Inc. had already apportioned 98.5% of the gain to
other states and had paid taxes there. Now it was being asked to
pay South Carolina tax on the same gain. Although the court did
not directly address the constitutional argument, it stated that
its decision apportioning the gain made the constitutional issue
moot.
2 6
Although the taxpayers in Boyle and Hercules did not real-
ize an actual gain, the court in Hercules stated, "We. . .hold.
that the gain which is allocable to South Carolina under § 12-7-
1120(4) is gain represented by a true and actual profit as con-
trasted with a profit brought into being by reason of recapturing
depreciation."' 28 The court thus indicates that when an actual
gain takes place, the taxpayer should apportion to the various
states any gain represented by recapture of depreciation, and
then allocate the balance to South Carolina. Dealing with taxa-
tion in this manner can lead to several problems. First, corpo-
rate record keeping will be very cumbersome if the specific
amount of depreciation apportioned yearly from each piece of
property to each state must be shown. Second, the opinion does
not address the possibility of a loss occurring even after recap-
ture, but considered in light of the language of section 12-7-
1120(4),29 the opinion seems to mandate South Carolina's allo-
cating all of the loss to itself in such a case. Third, as empha-
sized by the taxpayer in Boyle, the statutes of most other states
require apportionment of the gains and losses from business re-
lated sales, and allocation only of those from non-business sales
of real property. The South Carolina statute does not make this
25. 279 S.C. at 181-182, 304 S.E.2d at 818. Both issues were raised in Boyle, but
were overshadowed by the much more strongly argued issue of statutory interpretation,
and the supreme court opinion did not even allude to them. The trial court treated them
perfunctorily. Record at 15-16, 20-21, Boyle.
26. 279 S.C. at 182, 304 S.E.2d at 818-19. In interpreting the statute, the court com-
mented that there could be no serious contention that the South Carolina legislature
intended the result of § 12-7-1120(4) to be either a denial of depreciation recapture to
other states or double taxation of Hercules, Inc. Id. at 181-82, 304 S.E.2d at 818. This
analysis reflects a concern for the constitutional issues.
27. I.e., the excess of sales price over purchase price.
28. 279 S.C. at 182, 304 S.E.2d at 818.
29. See supra note 7.
1985]
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distinction."0 The South Carolina Tax Commission's policy has
been to require no recapture of the depreciation taken in South
Carolina upon the sale of any real property with a situs outside
the state.31 The result in Hercules could lead to a decision to
attempt to recapture depreciation from corporate sales of both
business and non-business real property in other states.32 The
disparity in treatment between South Carolina and other states
could result in double taxation for multistate corporations doing
business in South Carolina."3
Because of the difficulties in administering section 12-7-
1120(4) under the rule established in Hercules, the legislature
may consider amending it.34 Section 12-7-1120 was last amended
in 1977, although the section allocating gain from the sale of real
property was not changed. Under the present code, the problem
in Boyle would never arise since the material formerly appearing
in section 12-7-1120(6), 35 dealing with tangible personal prop-
erty, was completely deleted.36 The amendment also changed the
30. The South Carolina Allocation and Apportionment of Income Act, Pub. L. No.
732, 1958 S.C. Acts 1574 (now codified at S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 12-7-1110 to -1200 (1976 &
Supp. 1983)), included parts of the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act
(UDITPA), but did not include the language specifically relating to business income.
Record at 17-18, Boyle; Brief of Appellant at 5-6, Boyle.
31. Record at 99, Hercules.
32. Business property would present no problem, since most other states provide for
these gains to be apportioned. A source at the Tax Commission indicates that South
Carolina does intend to recapture depreciation on sales of real property in other states.
See infra note 34.
33. See, e.g., the following provision:
Gains from the sale of tangible or intangible property not held, owned, or
used in connection with the trade or business of the corporation nor held for
sale in the regular course of business shall be allocated to this state if the prop-
erty sold is real or tangible personal property situated in this state or intangi-
ble property having an actual situs or a business situs within this state. Other-
wise, the gains shall not be allocated to this state.
GA. CODE ANN. § 48-7-31(c)(3) (1982)(emphasis added). Unlike its South Carolina coun-
terpart, this section does not indicate that gains from sales of similar property located in
other states shall be allocated to those states. It is possible to conclude that Georgia will
tax, by apportionment, gains on the sale of non-business property located in other states
and Bold by corporations doing business in Georgia.
34. The South Carolina Tax Commission plans to recommend changes in the law,
but has not yet formulated specific proposals. Telephone interview with Charles B.
Brown, Supervisor, Research and Review of Income and Estate Division, South Carolina
Tax Commission (Sept. 23, 1983).
35. See supra note 5.
36. This amendment was effective April 19, 1977, for tax years beginning on or after
January 1, 1977. The action in Boyle was not commenced until November 9, 1977 and
6
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section dealing with gains from sales of intangible personal
property, so that now only non-business income is allocated. 7
An amendment to section 12-7-1120(4) could also provide that
only gains from non-business real property would be allocated.
Another possibility would be to consider land and improvements
separately, allocating all gains from land sales to the situs state.
Since land is not depreciable, such an amendment would avoid
the problem presented in Hercules.
II. APPLICABILITY OF LIENS FOR AD VALOREM TAXES TO AFTER-
ACQUIRED INVENTORY
In Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Lee,s5 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court interpreted sections 12-49-10,39 12-49-2040 and 12-
49-30' 1 of the South Carolina Code as a unit, determining that
liens for ad valorem taxes on a merchant's inventory take prece-
dence over the security interests of inventory creditors. The
the supreme court opinion was dated April 18, 1979. However, the change in the law was
not considered, even by analogy, at any level of the litigation.
37. "Gains and losses from sales of intangible personal property not connected with
the business of the taxpayer other than any intangible personal property held for sale to
customers in the regular course of business... shall be allocated to the state of a corpo-
ration taxpayer's principal place of business ..... S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-7-1120(5)(Supp.
1983) (emphasis added). The sections were renumbered and the emphasized words
added by the 1977 amendment.
38. 278 S.C. 565, 299 S.E.2d 488 (1983).
39. All taxes, assessments and penalties legally assessed shall be considered
and held as a debt payable to the State by the person against whom they shall
be charged and such taxes, assessments and penalties shall be a first lien in all
cases whatsoever upon the property taxed, the lien to attach at the beginning
of the fiscal year during which the tax is levied .... The county treasurer
may enforce such lien by execution against such property or, if it cannot be
levied on, he may proceed by action at law against the person holding such
property (emphasis added).
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-49-10 (1976).
40. As of December thirty-first a first lien shall attach to all real and personal
property for taxes to be paid during the ensuing year, and in case such prop-
erty is about to be removed from the State by bankruptcy proceedings or oth-
erwise or is about to be taken from the jurisdiction of the county before taxes
are due in the county and payable for any year, the treasurer of such county
shall immediately issue his execution on such property and the sheriff of the
county shall proceed to collect the taxes due on such property.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-49-20 (1976).
41."The lien for unpaid taxes on personal property shall also attach to any personal
property subsequently acquired by the delinquent taxpayer." S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-49-30
(1976).
7
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court made clear that the tax liens are applied to the general
inventory of a delinquent taxpayer, including inventory acquired
after the tax lien attaches to the merchant's current inventory.
In April 1973, Chrysler Credit entered into a security agree-
ment with Freeman Dodge, Inc., secured by all "existing or here-
after acquired inventory on 42 parts and accessories, including all
proceeds thereof... .43 The financing statement was duly re-
corded April 17, 1973. On January 30, 1975, Freeman defaulted
and Chrysler Credit repossessed several cars, proposing to sell
them to satisfy the debt. Asserting rights established by the
filing of a tax lien, the Tax Collector of Sumter County then
seized several of these cars to be sold to pay Freeman's delin-
quent taxes for the years 1974 and 1975."
In the summer of 1975, Chrysler Credit brought suit to stop
the county from proceeding with the sale.45 The circuit judge or-
dered the vehicles sold and the taxes paid under protest.
Chrysler Credit then brought suit to recover these taxes. The
lower court granted summary judgment to Sumter County, and
Chrysler Credit appealed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the tax lien
was superior to that of the secured creditor, Chrysler Credit, and
that this lien applied to Freeman's entire inventory, including
subsequently acquired property.46 The court noted that treating
automobile dealers differently from other merchants, by apply-
ing tax liens to specific cars rather than to inventory generally,
would hinder the sale of new automobiles because customers
would fear buying cars which might be subject to a tax lien."7
42. This word appears as "on," Record at 10, 22, and as "or," id. at 47.
43. Record at 10, 22, 47.
44. Record at 46.
45. The case was heard upon a temporary restraining order and a Rule to Show
Cause directed to Sumter County by Judge Laney, who issued an Order dated June 13,
1975. Record at 46.
46. 278 S.C. at 567, 299 S.E.2d at 489.
47. Id. Chrysler Credit was able to identify the individual cars in inventory at the
close of Freeman Dodge's fiscal year, and insisted that the county's lien should apply
only to these. Record at 26-27. The Appellant also argued that the trial court erred in
treating automobiles as fungible goods, when they are by law individually titled and reg-
istered as separate pieces of property. Record at 63. The county argued that to apply the
lien to individual cars, rather than to inventory as an entity, would be to exempt auto-
mobile dealers from the statutory provisions applicable to other merchants. Brief of Re-
spondent at 11. The trial court emphasized that merchants are required to return a
value, in a single dollar figure, to the Tax Commission, Record at 55, and that there is no
[Vol. 36
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In this case, although the cars seized by the county were
inventory, they were not necessarily the same vehicles that were
in inventory when the tax was assessed.4 8 Chrysler did not dis-
pute the validity or amount of the taxes due,4' and agreed that a
first lien attached to those cars in inventory at the time of the
1975 tax assessment.50 Chrysler's contention was that a first lien
did not attach to cars which entered the Freeman Dodge inven-
tory after Freeman filed its tax return; rather, Chrysler argued
that a first lien attached only to the original property on which
taxes were unpaid.51 Chrysler asserted that the county's remedy
was to follow the specifically taxed cars into the hands of their
new owners, customers of Freeman Dodge. 2 Chrysler relied
upon the language of section 12-49-10, which states that the first
lien shall be upon the property taxed,53 and noted that section
12-49-30, which allows attachment of a tax lien to subsequently
acquired personal property, does not specify a first lien."
The county, on the other hand, asserted that the "property
taxed" was not each individual car, but inventory, which would
automatically include subsequently acquired automobiles. 5 The
court agreed that the language of section 12-49-30 gave the
county a lien on Freeman Dodge's after-acquired property.5 6
The county also argued that a merchant-vendor which ex-
tends credit to a merchant is in a better position to protect itself
than is a consumer-purchaser. 7 The court, in refusing to allow
more reason to break down inventory of a car dealership to show when individual items
came into possession than there would be to do so with inventory of a grocery or hard-
ware store. Id. at 59.
48. Record at 1-2.
49. Record at 47-49.
50. Record at 26-27.
51. Brief of Appellant at 4.
52. Brief of Appellant at 11 (citing 1970 Ops. Att'y Gen. S.C. 177, No. 3199).
53. See supra note 39.
54. See supra note 41.
55. Brief of Respondent at 6.
56. 278 S.C. at 567, 299 S.E.2d at 489. The court noted use of the words "the lien"
rather than "a lien" and the word "also." These words in § 12-49-30, they concluded,
referred to the first lien created in §§ 12-49-10 and 12-49-20. See also Brief of Respon-
dent at 7. For text of Code, see supra notes 39-41.
57. Brief of Respondent at 12. Placing the burden on the vendor merely suggests
that such creditors should assure themselves, before extending credit, that taxes are not
in arrears. Brief of Respondent at 9 (citing International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Good-
rich, 350 U.S. 537 (1956)).
1985] 253
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Chrysler's contention that the county should assert its liens
against automobiles sold to Freeman's customers, apparently ac-
cepted this policy argument.
The propriety of a first priority lien for ad valorem taxes
upon the property taxed is unquestioned.58 Although this deci-
sion adds nothing startling to the law in South Carolina, it does
clarify the application of sections 12-49-10 through 12-49-0.
Both secured parties and merchants, particularly automobile
dealers, must be aware that liens for ad valorem taxes attach to
all of a merchant's personalty as of the end of the tax year, al-
though the taxes were computed on the basis of inventory at an
earlier date.
The result reached by the court seems reasonable, especially
considering that the priority of tax liens is well established.59
The only alternative to this decision would be for the Tax Com-
mission to forego collection or to assert liens against automobiles
purchased from a delinquent dealership by private customers.
III. CHALLENGES TO REASONABLENESS OF UTILITY RATE
STRUCTURES MUST BE SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE OF UTnLIy's
EXCESS PROFITS
In Mims v. Edgefield County Water & Sewer Authority,0
the South Carolina Supreme Court considered a consumer's
challenge to a utility rate structure. In South Carolina, an indi-
vidual consumer has little chance of successfully challenging
utility rates. South Carolina is typical of most states in deter-
mining the reasonableness of utility rates by considering the
utility's overall profits. In Mims, the court refused to address
the plaintiff's individual situation because she did not present
evidence of the financial condition of the defendant water
authority.
The plaintiff owned a retirement home which was equipped
with a fire prevention system consisting of a six-inch water line
servicing 350 sprinkler heads. The defendant utility distin-
58. Record at 55-56 (citing U.S. v. Clover Spinning Mills Co., 244 F. Supp. 796
(D.S.C. 1965), rev'd and remanded, 373 F.2d 274 (4th Cir. 1966); Holmes v. Weinheimer,
66 S.C. 18, 44 S.E. 82 (1903)).
59. See supra note 57.
60. 278 S.C. 554, 299 S.E.2d 484 (1983).
[Vol. 36
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guished between its 3,400 paying domestic customers, which it
charged at a meter rate, and its 12 sprinkler system customers,
which it charged at $2.00 per sprinkler head.61 All sprinkler cus-
tomers, with the exception of plaintiff, were industrial users.62
Plaintiff contended that her $700 bill was unreasonable because
there was no rational basis for a charge per sprinkler head.
Water pressure sufficient to activate the entire sprinkler system
is never supplied because all the sprinklers are never in opera-
tion at once; only those sprinklers located in the area of a fire
will be activated."s Plaintiff compared her rates with those
charged to the Town of Edgefield for water service to fire hy-
drants, and contended that a reasonable charge would be an an-
nual charge for the water line, similar to the line serving a fire
hydrant, which served her building."
Defendant countered that a particular rate is unreasonable
only if the utility garners excess profits. Any single utility bill
may be "viewed in solitary isolation from the perspective of the
consumer and made to appear onerous. '6 5 Because every cus-
tomer's use is unique, each would be entitled to an individual
rate structure.66 The defendant utility argued that "by its na-
ture, the charge can only be unreasonable to all of the customers
of a particular class or to none of them.16 7 Although the trial
court found for plaintiff, the South Carolina Supreme Court
held that plaintiff had not met her burden of proof. Plaintiff
presented evidence only from her perspective, but the reasona-
bleness of rates must be determined by the amount of the util-
ity's return on its investment.65
61. Brief of Respondent at 3. Case law indicates that a charge for the mere availabil-
ity of water for fire service is legal. See, e.g., Gordon & Ferguson v. Doran, 100 Minn.
343, 349-50, 111 N.W. 272, 274 (1907); Keystone Inv. Co. v. Metropolitan Utils. Dist., 113
Neb. 132, 135-37, 202 N.W. 416, 417 (1925).
62. Brief of Respondent at 3.
63. Id. at 5.
64. Plaintiff asserted unfairness in a $25 charge per fire hydrant served by a line the
same size as that which served her sprinkler heads at $700. Defendant contended that
the comparison should be $25 per hydrant versus $2 per sprinkler, or $2,900 charged to
the city for 116 fire hydrants compared to $700 for plaintiff's entire sprinkler system.
Brief of Appellant at 9. See also Keystone Inv. Co. v. Metropolitan Utils. Dist., 113 Neb.
132, 137, 202 N.W. 416, 417 (1925).
65. Brief of Appellant at 12.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 13.
68. 278 S.C. at 555-56, 299 S.E.2d at 486.
1985] 255
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In support of this proposition, the court cited one South
Carolina case, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co. v.
Public Service Commission,ee and two United States Supreme
Court cases, Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Pub-
lic Service Commission" and Smyth v. Ames. 1 These cases,
however, are suits by utilities which claimed that the rates set
by the government were too low and resulted in unconstitutional
confiscation of property.72 None of the decisions set forth analy-
ses from a consumer's standpoint, beyond the general statement
that the public should pay only the amount the service is
worth. 3 In relying only on these cases, the court in Mims did
not address the effects of the rate schedule upon the individual,
but required that the plaintiff prove the utility's overall profit
was unreasonable. The court ignored plaintiff's argument that a
charge based on the amount of water made available through the
line would be more appropriate.
Instead of asserting that the charges were "unreasonable"
and "excessive", which the court finds determined by the rea-
sonableness of the utility's profit, plaintiff might have alleged
discrimination-that she was wrongfully classified as an indus-
trial user. 4 The success of such a charge is doubtful, for as long
as the user classification is not arbitrary and is based on real
differences among consumers, it is generally upheld.75 For exam-
ple, in City of Kermit v. Rush, 6 the municipal water company
assessed one minimum water rate per month against hotels and
motels, but classified apartment houses and trailer parks as mul-
tiple-unit users, charging the complexes a monthly minimum for
each occupied living unit.77 This classification was upheld. In
69. 270 S.C. 590, 244 S.E.2d 278 (1978).
70. 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
71. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
72. 262 U.S. at 683, 690; 169 U.S. at 523; 270 S.C. at 595, 244 S.E.2d at 280-81.
73. 169 U.S. at 547; 270 S.C. at 595, 244 S.E.2d at 281.
74. Brief of Respondent at 3. A classification consisting of a single consumer is not
necessarily discriminatory. Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1331, 1333, 1338 (1955). Plaintiff might
have argued that she occupied a unique position, as the only non-industrial sprinkler
user. However, the fact that she could legitimately be classified separately would not
compel the utility to so classify her absent evidence that the present classification was
arbitrary and unduly discriminatory.
75. Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1331, 1332, 1333, 1338 n.3.
76. 351 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
77. Id. See also St. Clair v. Harris County Water Control and Improvement Dist.,
474 S.W.2d 545 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971).
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general, courts have held that, "The interests and needs of the
numerous water users served by a city are such that it is improb-
able, if not impossible, that any classification or rate basis could
be devised which would not in some way discriminate against
some of the users. ' 7' Therefore, a utility may discriminate
against an individual consumer as long as the discrimination is
not unjust or oppressive." The classification of "sprinkler users"
is probably reasonable because it is based on a difference in use,
although an industrial versus residential distinction is often
made.80
The result in Mims, although decided without specifically
addressing all the issues, is consistent with opinions in the ma-
jority of jurisdictions, refusing to uphold an individual con-
sumer's challenge to utility rates when that challenge is based
upon the effect of the rate structure upon the individual.
IV. TAx TREATMENT OF BUILDINGS DONATED TO CHARITABLE
INSTITUTIONS
The South Carolina Court of Appeals, in Citadel Develop-
ment Foundation v. County of Greenville,81 noted that a build-
ing deeded to an educational institution is tax exempt under
section 12-37-220 of the South Carolina Code.e2 However, the
78. 351 S.W.2d at 599-600 (quoting Caldwell v. City of Abilene, 260 S.W.2d 712, 714
(Tex. Civ. App. 1953)). The court also points out that the difference in water rates need
not be based upon the economic factor of cost. Id.
79. E.g., Indiana Natural & Illuminating Gas Co. v. State ex rel. Ball, 158 Ind. 516,
522-23, 63 N.E. 200, 222 (1902); Fretz v. City of Edmund, 66 Okla. 262, 265, 168 P. 800,
802, 803 (1917); City of Kermit v. Rush, 351 S.W.2d 598, 599-600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961);
Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1331, 1333, 1339 (1955).
80. See generally Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 1331 (1955).
81. 279 S.C. 344, 308 S.E.2d 797 (S.C. Ct. App. 1983).
82. The Code exempts from ad valorem taxation:
(1) all property of the State, counties, municipalities, school districts, Water
and Sewer Authorities and other political subdivisions, if the property is used
exclusively for public purposes, and it shall be the duty of the Tax Commission
and county assessor to determine whether such property is used exclusively for
public purposes;
(2) all property of all schools, colleges and other institutions of learning and all
charitable institutions in the nature of hospitals and institutions caring for the
infirmed, the handicapped, the aged, children and indigent persons, except
where the profits of such institutions are applied to private use;
(3) all property of all public libraries, churches, parsonages and burying
grounds;
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court held that a building donated to a charitable corporation
which raises money to benefit the school is not exempt. Citadel,
the first decision by the court of appeals, has serious ramifica-
tions. A tax exempt organization will now have to choose be-
tween limited liability and tax exempt status in deciding how to
conduct activities peripheral to its main function.
The Citadel Development Foundation is a charitable corpo-
ration which receives and spends funds to benefit The Citadel, a
state-supported college. In 1979 the Daniel Building in Green-
ville, South Carolina, was donated to the Foundation. During
the 1979 and 1980 tax years, the building was leased to Daniel
International Corporation, which later bought it from the Foun-
dation. The Foundation paid, under protest, 1979 and 1980 city
and county taxes on the building, which it sought to recover in
this action.8 3 The Foundation, characterizing itself as part of
The Citadel, 4 contended that it was tax exempt under South
Carolina Code section 12-37-220(2) 85 as a school, college, or
other institution of learning. The Foundation argued that al-
though legal title was in the Foundation, beneficial ownership of
the Daniel building was in The Citadel.88
The South Carolina Court of Appeals followed the general
rule that statutes creating tax exemptions are to be construed
strictly. 7 Calling attention to public policy in support of this
rule, the court noted that government services must be paid for
and that each tax exemption increases the burden upon other
taxpayers.8 8 The court dismissed the beneficial ownership argu-
(4) all property of all charitable trusts and foundations used exclusively for
charitable and public purposes....
The exemptions provided in items (3) and (4) for real property shall not
extend beyond the buildings and premises actually occupied by the owners of
such real property.
S.C. CODE ANN. §12-37o220(A) (1976).
83. 279 S.C. at 346, 308 S.E.2d at 799.
84. Id. at 347, 308 S.E.2d at 798. The Foundation offices are located at The Citadel,
and its employees are paid by the college. The Vice President of Development for The
Citadel supervises the Executive Director of the Foundation and several trustees of The
Citadel are also trustees of the Foundation. The charter of the Foundation provides that
upon dissolution all assets will be transferred to a tax exempt entity-but not necessarily
to The Citadel or to an organization benefiting the school. Id. at 346, 308 S.E.2d at 798.
85. See supra note 82.
86. 279 S.C. at 347, 308 S.E.2d at 799.
87. Id. at 348, 308 S.E.2d at 799.
88. Id. at 348, 308 S.E.2d at 800. "This principle is sometimes expressed as the first
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ment as tenuous, and stated that, "It is one thing to say the
Foundation benefits The Citadel, but quite another to claim The
Citadel is the beneficial owner of Foundation property."89 The
court noted that the Foundation did not hold the deed in trust,
distinguishing cases relied upon by plaintiff.90
The court further noted that, "[T]he Foundation is an en-
tity separate from The Citadel and itself has none of the usual
characteristics of a school, college or other institution of learn-
ing."91 The decision did not specify what ties would suffice to
support a finding that "the Foundation's relationship with The
Citadel renders it an institution of learning in its own right"
92
and therefore tax exempt.
The court compared the case with City of Ann Arbor v.
University Cellar, Inc.,9 3 which considered taxability of the in-
ventory of a campus bookstore at the University of Michigan.
The University's board of regents had approved the store's gen-
eral plan and had provided its initial capital. The board also re-
tained the power to terminate the store's right to operate on
campus, and to liquidate its assets which, at dissolution, were to
go to the board of regents. The board of directors of the store
consisted exclusively of university student government members,
faculty, and administrators. e4 The Michigan Appeals Court
noted that other corporations established by the University of
Michigan had been declared exempt by the Tax Commission,"
law of economics, to wit- 'There's no such thing as a free lunch."' Id. at 348 n.1, 308
S.E.2d at 800 n.1.
89. Id. at 349, 308 S.E.2d at 800.
90. Id. at 348-49, 308 S.E.2d at 800.
91. Id. at 346, 308 S.E.2d at 798.
92. Id. at 348, 308 S.E.2d at 800.
93. 65 Mich. App. 512, 237 N.W.2d 535 (1975), rev'd, 401 Mich. 279, 258 N.W.2d 1
(1977).
94. 65 Mich. App. at 514-15, 237 N.W.2d at 537.
The Michigan court used a totality of circumstances test to determine whether the
university exercised enough control over the corporation. The elements were:
a) makeup of the corporation's managing board and the method of their
selection;
b) initial and continuing financing;
c) degree of control over operations and existence of the corporation;
d) responsibility for corporation's liabilities;
e) stated purpose in the articles of incorporation; and
f) location of the premises.
Id. at 520, 237 N.W.2d at 539.
95. 65 Mich. App. at 518-19, 237 N.W.2d at 539 (referring to City of Ann Arbor v.
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and held that the University store was likewise tax exempt.
However, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed, stating that,
"[E]xemption of the [store's] stock-in-trade is consistent with
the purpose of the exemption but does not touch the question
whether the [store's] property is, in substance, the property of
the University." ' Such a determination, the court held, depends
upon "whether the Regents or persons acting for and responsible
to them so dominate the management and operation of the
[store] that its separate corporate identity should be ignored. ' e7
The court answered in the negative,"8 and emphasized that a
major purpose of incorporating the bookstore was to insulate the
university from liability to the store's creditors.99 The court re-
fused to "disregard the corporate entity and treat the [store] as
the alter ego of the University for tax exemption purposes, and
yet regard it as a separate entity for purposes of determining
. . . liability."' 00 The South Carolina Court of Appeals did not
address this aspect of the Foundation's assertion that it was part
of The Citadel, but instead noted that, as in the Michigan case,
University Cellar, the "school did not maintain managerial and
operational control of the board of directors of the organization
seeking exemption."110
The relationship between The Citadel and the Foundation
is more tenuous than the connection at issue in University Cel-
lar. While assets of the bookstore were to revert automatically to
the Michigan Board of Regents, there is no such provision in the
Foundation's charter. If the Foundation had been dissolved in
1980, the Daniel Building would not necessarily have become the
State Tax Comm'n, 393 Mich. 52, 223 N.W.2d 1 (1974)).
96. 401 Mich. 279, 285, 258 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1977).
97. Id. at 285-86, 258 N.W.2d at 3.
98. Id. at 286, 258 N.W.2d at 3. The court disagreed with the conclusion by the
appeals court that, "The University... is alone represented on the defendant's board of
directors, as the board is selected only by institutional bodies officially recognized by the
Regents as integral parts of the university." 65 Mich. App. at 520-21, 237 N.W.2d at 540.
The supreme court pointed out that although the Student Government Council and
Faculty Assembly are part of the University Community, both are independent organiza-
tions not under the control of the Regents. 401 Mich. at 287, 258 N.W.2d at 3. The court
found it irrelevant that the inventory would be exempt if the university itself conducted
the business. Id. at 293, 258 N.W.2d at 6.
99. 401 Mich. at 287-88, 258 N.W.2d at 4.
100. Id. at 291, 258 N.W.2d at 5. Neither tort nor contract liability was actually at
issue in this case.
101. 279 S.C. at 349, 308 S.E.2d at 800.
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property of The Citadel, or of any organization holding it in
trust for The Citadel. In light of University Cellar, the court's
finding that The Citadel was not the beneficial owner of the
property is correct. While the board of directors of the Univer-
sity Cellar were all directly connected with the University of
Michigan as students, faculty or administrators, 102 the directors
of the Foundation are not necessarily tied to The Citadel. On
the other hand, the Foundation and The Citadel share several
trustees, which indicates a close, informal relationship. Although
not mentioned by the court of appeals, District of Columbia v.
Catholic Education Press,10 3 cited in University Cellar, found
that a corporation established by a university was tax exempt.
The Press offices were located in the administration building of
the University, and all the corporation's revenues went into the
University treasury. Most importantly, the board of trustees of
the Press consisted of the executive committee of the board of
trustees of the University, and the officers of the Press and of
the University were identical. 10 4 This form of direct control
might support a finding of tax exempt status under the South
Carolina statute.
Following the decision in Citadel, tax exempt organizations
in South Carolina should be on notice that fund raising or other
activities conducted through separate corporate entities may
cost these activities their tax exempt status.
Phyllis B. Burkhard
102. 65 Mich. App. at 514-15, 237 N.W.2d at 537.
103. 199 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
104. Id. at 178-79. In University Cellar, the Supreme Court of Michigan rejected
the reasoning of the court in Catholic Educ. Press, which stated:
If The Catholic University of America, in its own name, should engage in activ-
ities identical with those of its subsidiary, the Catholic Education Press, we
suppose its right to exemption from taxation on the personal property used in
such activities would not be questioned. We see no reason for denying the ex-
emption to the University merely because it chooses to do the work through a
separate non-profit corporation.
199 F.2d at 179. The dissent in Catholic Educ. Press more closely parallels the Citadel
and University Cellar decisions. Id. at 180.
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